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Abstract 
This paper discusses conflict of Sunni-Shi`a which occurs in East Java. The 
relationship among them is dominated by contravention, competition/contestation 
and conflict. The contravention occurs during the emergence of Shi`ite community in 
Madura. when the majority of Madurese community who are mostly Sunni rejected 
their first existence. For instance, Ali Karrar Shinhaji (The local Ulama) was against 
the decision of Kyai Makmun to deliver his son, Tajul Muluk, to study at YAPI 
Bangil that affiliated with Shi`i. The conflict further escalates because of Tajul 
Muluk’s and Roisul Hukama’s personal problem. Eventually, the conflict thus 
increases on the higher level in Sampang and in Province level.  This paper examines 
how the conflict of Sunn-Shi`i emerges, whether it is a pure of family conflict or 
involves the conflict among the religious authorities in Sampang society.  This paper 
utilizes Myers’ theory combined with critical discourse analysis on the causal factor 
of conflict. Through both bibliographical and empirical investigation, this paper 
finds that the conflict emerges from family to province, when the contestation and 
conflict between Tajul Muluk and Roisul Hukama increase to higher level, from 
community of Sampang to East Java Province. In addition, this conflict also involves 
the contestation among religious authorities, when the positivisation of fatwa, which 
is morally binding, transforms into a public policy of the government that legally 
binding is the evident of this conflict. 
 
Keywords: Conflict, Sunni-Shi`ite, Fatwa, Public Policy, Violence, 
Discrimination. 
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A. Introduction 
Contravention, competition and conflict are three categories 
useful to be implied on discussing social interaction between Sunni 
and Shi’a community in Sampang. The social interaction1 as a 
scientific term needs some requirements to classify, started with the 
contravention category. Contravention category was chosen because 
the majority of Sampang society is Sunni, and more specific are 
followers of Nahdlatul Ulama (The Awakening of Ulama) and the 
emergence of Shi’a community has contravened it. Kyai Makmun, a 
Muslim scholar in Sampang who highly respected the success of the 
Iranian Revolution and its leader Ayatullah Khomeini started the 
Shi’a community in Sampang, by converting his own family 
members. After receiving many books about Shi’a, he thus 
encouraged his son, Tajul Muluk, to study at YAPI Islamic boarding 
School, one of the Islamic boarding schools closely affiliated with the 
Shi`a. his decision was protested by Ali Karrar Shinhaji2 by 
demanding him to stop Muluk’s study at YAPI3 with two reasons. 
First, he argued that YAPI is a Shi’ite college different from the Buju 
doctrine (circle of kyai) in Batu Ampar. Second, according to him, 
YAPI is not affiliated with the family or circle of knowledge (Sanad 
al Ilmi) for many Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in Madura.4  
Karrar’s protest shows how contravention occurs during the 
emergence of Shi`a in Sampang. Ali Karrar was worried that the 
emergence of Shi`a would change the orthodoxy of the Islamic 
tradition in Sampang. When Tajul and Rois returned to Sampang, 
Rois received and accepted his father’s idea to support Islamic 
teaching in Madrasa, while Tajul chose to continue his studies in 
Saudi Arabia. He studied at the same college Ali Karrar did: Maliki 
                                                          
1 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 206. 
2 Ali Karraf Shinhaji is the local ulama in Sampang and pamekasan who has the 
family relationship with Kyai Makmun. Kyai Ali Karrar has the high influence on local 
community in Sampang. He has the four Islamic Boarding Schools in Madura. Both kyai 
Makmun and Kyai Ali Karrar ae local ulama those have the charismatic influence. 
3 Muhammad Afdillah, Dari Masjid Ke Panggung Politik Melacak Akar-Akar 
Kekerasan Agama antara komunitas Sunni dan Syiah di Sampang, Jawa Timur  (Yogyakarta: 
CRCS UGM, 2016), 54. 
4 Ibid. 41. 
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Islamic college. Unsatisfied with his studies, Tajul quit and became a 
migrant worker in Saudi Arabia and met Muhammad Liwa Mahdi, a 
follower of Shi`a from Qatif Arab Saudi. Mahdi was a student of King 
Abdul Aziz University and provided books about Shi’a for Tajul 
Muluk. 
Competition also colors the social interactions between the 
Sunni and Shi`a in Sampang. It was started by two local clerics (Kyai 
Makmun and Kyai Ali Karrar). Kyai Ali Karrar is the local Ulama 
who protected the tradition of Buju in Madura. I travelled to 
Sampang and Pamekasan, Madura, and observed his four Islamic 
Boarding Schools. There is a convention, according to Ali Karrar, 
that every Madurese must only study at Islamic boarding schools in 
Madura. If they go outside of Madura, it should at least be affiliated 
with the Islamic Boarding School of Madurese Kyai. This is to 
protect the Ahl Assunnah wa Aljama’ah (Sunni) Madurese Islamic 
ideology. Sunni itself refers to Asy’ariyan and Maturidiyah in Islamic 
theology; refers to Syafi’i and it still recognizes the Maliki, Hanafi 
and Hambali schools in fiqh/Islamic law; and refers to Al Ghazali and 
Junaid al Baghdadi in Tasawuf (Islamic mysticism).5 Shi`a is outside 
of Sunni theology, fiqh and Tasawuf (Islamic mysticism), and 
because Shi’s is different than Sunni, it has become a point of 
contention. Kyai Ali Karrar himself is a chairman of BASSRA 
(Badan Silaturrahmi Ulama Pesantren Madura/The Ulema 
Association of Madurese Islamic Boarding School) and the chairman 
of FMU (Forum Musyawarah Ulama/Ulema Forum for Consultancy). 
Therefore he is influential in the Pamekasan and Sampang societies. 6 
Kyai Makmun (the father of Tajul Muluk and Roisul Hukama) 
was a local cleric in a poor village in Sampang. However, the Muslim 
community highly respected him and gave him the title Rah Toan 
because he was from a respected clerics dynasty. His student even 
gave ‘subjunctive words’ if they were permitted to touch the floor 
with their forehead (sujud) in this world to Kyai Makmun.7 Both 
Kyai Makmun and Kyai Ali Karrar had high influence among the 
                                                          
5 Kyai Ali Karrar Shinhaji was interviewed on Friday, 23 March 2018 at 10.00 AM at 
his Islamic boarding School. 
6 Muhammad Afdillah, Dari Masjid Ke Panggung politik, 40. 
7 Ibid., 40. 
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Madurese society, but they had different trajectories. Ali Karrar 
preferred to use the structure of society, while Kyai Makmun 
preferred the cultural approach. Ali Karrar had many Islamic 
boarding schools, while Kyai Makmun had social intimacy through 
social interaction with people. 
In the end, the conflict of social interaction between Sunni and 
Shiite firstly occurs on the micro level, namely the family. Makmun 
had five boys and three daughters. His family was split into two 
groups of ideology. The first group believed in Shi`a ideology while 
the second group followed Sunni ideology. Those who held Shi’a 
beliefs in the Makmun family were Tajul, Iklil, and Hani. The others; 
Rois, Budur, Fatimah, Kulsum and Ahmad; chose the Sunni ideology. 
 
Table 1. Groups of ideology of Makmun’s childrens. 
 
Shi`a Sunni 
 Tajul 
 Iklil 
 Hani  Rois 
 Fatimah 
 Kulsum 
 Budur 
 Ahmad 
 
The emergence of new Shi’a family in Sampang has 
successfully split and influenced the way Madurese categorize their 
society into two groups: in-group and out-group society. In-group is 
the Sunni, since they were the majority in Sampang, while the out-
group is the Shi`a, as the minority. Based on Pruitt and Rubin’s 
argument, it causes contestation, competition, and conflict within the 
society against each other.8 As minority, the Shi’a struggled to exist 
even though Tajul spread Shi`a openly. On other hand, the Sunni felt 
threatened by the existence of Shi`a in Sampang. They were afraid 
that Shi’a would outnumber Sunnis and become the majority 
ideology.  
It is obvious that the conflict between Sunni and Shi`i in 
Sampang starts from individual conflict between Tajul Muluk and 
                                                          
8 On this case on society commonly emerges the term ‘We’ and ‘They’ or in Arabic 
language ‘minna’ and ‘minhum’  the term of ‘We’ refers to Sunni while the term of ‘They’ 
refers to Shiah. See Ihsan Ali Fauzi, Ambivalensi Sebagai Peluang, Agama,Kekerasan, 
Upaya Perdamaian-perdamaian, Religio: Jurnal Studi Agama-agama, Comparative Religion 
department of Ushuluddin Faculty of  UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, Vol. 03, No. 01, Maret 
2013,  40. 
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Roisul Hukama and eventually grows as community conflict. Using 
Pruitt and Rubin’s understanding, conflict in social psychology is 
perception regarding perceived divergence of interest or a belief that 
the aspirations of conflicting parties cannot be achieved 
simultaneously. Interest is people's feelings about what he really 
wants.9 Conflict therefore is different perception regarding interests, 
because perceptual perceptions of conflict mean opening up the 
possibility that one party believes in a temporary conflict of interest 
the other party does not, then obviously one party is wrong. The 
interest on social psychology are two groups: individual interest and 
the community interest.10  
This paper will inquire, based on the previous understanding of 
conflict, how conflict is a series of conflict escalation between Sunni 
and Shi’ite in Sampang, Madura. Based on the bibliographical and 
empirical investigation, this paper proposes two research questions. 
The first, why the conflict between Sunni and Shi`i emerges? The 
second, what is the category of conflict escalation among them? In 
line with both questions, according to Myers, there are four things 
that cause conflict: social dilemmas, competition, perceived injustice, 
and misperception (misunderstanding).11 This paper will try to 
illuminate the conflict among Sunni and Shi`i in Sampang by 
considering all of those four causes. This paper will therefore begin 
with describing the historical background of Shi’i in Madura, in order 
to better understand how it correlates and interacts with Sunni 
people. From its history and social background, it will be easier to 
understand the characteristic of Madurese Shi`a and their relationship 
with their counterpart, the Sunni. 
 
B. Madurese Shi`ites: Historical and Social Background 
Beginning in early 1980, Makmun, a prominent figure of 
Islamic Clerics in Nangkernang, Karang Gayam Village, Sampang 
received news from his companion about the 1979’s Iranian 
                                                          
9 Dean G. Pruitt, Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Teori Konflik Sosial, translated by Helly P. 
Soetjipto (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar,2011), 9, 21- 22 
10 Faturochman, Keadilan Perspektif Psikologi Sosial (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 
2012), 25. 
11 David G. Myers, Social Psychology, tenth edition (McGraw-Hill, 2010), 184 - 484 
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Revolution. He was deeply inspired by the Revolution and was very 
impressed with Ayatullah Khomeini–the then leader of the Shi`a. Yet, 
Makmun was aware that spreading the Shi`a ideology in his village 
would be difficult because the majority of Muslims in his village 
embraced the Sunni ideology. Because of that, Makmun learned 
about the Shi`a gradually and indirectly and sent three of his sons 
(Iklil al Milal, Tajul Muluk, and Roisul Hukama) and their sister 
(Ummi Hani) to the Islamic Boarding School of YAPI in Bangil, 
Pasuruan. YAPI is well known as an Islamic boarding school 
affiliated with Shi`a Ja’fariyah. At YAPI, they spent years between 
1987-1991. During the process, Ali Karrar Sinhaji (the brother of 
Makmun) asked Makmun to recall Tajul Muluk and Raisul Hukama. 
YAPI, in Sinhaji’s opinion, is a Shi`ite Islamic boarding school. 
Makmun’s sons thus went back to Sampang in 1991.12  
Among those sons, only Tajul Muluk who continued his study 
at Mecca to learn Islam with Sayyid Muhammad al Maliki in 1993, 
while Roisul Hukama supported his father in managing their Islamic 
boarding school in their village. During the study, Tajul Muluk 
apparently had trouble with the funding of his studies which resulted 
in uncompleted study and became a migrant worker until he came 
back to Indonesia in 1999. During his life in Saudi Arabia, he met 
Muhammad Liwa’ Mahdi, who was a follower of Shi`a in the Qatif 
Region of Saudi Arabia. He provided books of Shi`a for Tajul Muluk, 
who then studied the books for roughly six years during his time in 
Saudi Arabia.13 
Coming back, Tajul Muluk received a land from the villagers to 
build a house, which also functioned as an Islamic boarding school 
that included a place for prayer and Islamic teaching. Tajul Muluk 
gave lessons about the Shi`a doctrine at Misbahul Huda Islamic 
Boarding School. He and his brother taught the Islamic students at 
the boarding school. In contrast to his father’s method of spreading 
Shi`a, Tajul Muluk tended to be more open than Makmun.  
                                                          
12 Mundiroh Lailatul Munawaroh , Penyelesaian Konflik Sunni-Syiah di Sampang 
Madura, (Yogyakarta: Tesis UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2014), 52-53. Compare with Muhammad 
Afdillah, Dari Masjid Ke Panggung Politik; Studi Kasus Peran Pemuka Agama dan Politisi 
dalam Konflik Kekerasan Agama antara Komunitas Sunni dan Syiah di Sampang Jawa 
Timur (Yogyakarta: UGM CRCS:2013), 59. 
13 Ibid.,52-53. 
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Tajul Muluk became a young Muslim chairman and prominent 
Islamic scholar after he taught Islam in his village. In only a short 
time (about three years), Tajul Muluk had more than a hundred 
followers who also became his loyal students. At the beginning of 
2003 he only taught Shi`a to 8 people, most of whom were in his 
family. Until 2012 the number of his followers increased to 600 
followers. From 50 households, this new community then grew into 
150 households in 2011. In 2007, they joined IJABI (Ikatan Jama’ah 
Ahlul Bait Indonesia/Assosiation of Ahlul Bait Group in Indonesia), 
a nationally official organization of Shi`a in Indonesia.  
When Tajul Muluk spread Shi`a in his village, he received harsh 
responses from local Muslim clerics. One of them was Ali Karrar 
Sinhaji, the chairman of the Islamic boarding school of “Darut 
Tauhid,” in Lenteng Village, Proppo District, Pamekasan region. At 
the beginning of 2004, Ali Karrar Sinhaji strongly disagreed with the 
activity of Tajul Muluk regarding the Shi`a in Sampang. When I 
interviewed Ali Karar Shinhaji, he stated that the Shi`a was a deviant 
sect and it tended to deviate others.14 Another Muslim scholars in 
Sampang shared the same opinion; as well as many other Muslim 
scholars in Omben also had the same opinion. Although they did not 
agree with Tajul Muluk’s activities, they did not stop them because 
they still respect his father, Makmun, as a prominent Muslim cleric in 
Sampang. In June 2004, Makmun fell sick and passed away. After he 
died, opponents felt free to intervene with Tajul Muluk’s Shi`a 
movement in Sampang. Moreover, although the Shi`a teaching in 
Sampang was first introduced by Tajul Muluk and Roisul Hukama, 
problems emerged after conflict came between the two. As the result, 
Roisul Hukama converted to Sunni from Shi’a and made the family 
of Makmun split. This is the starting point in the conflict of the Shi’a 
in Sampang, from family level to communal level. 
To understand the Shi`a in Sampang, we have to understand the 
characteristic of societies located in the regency. The character of 
Sampang society is constructed through three pillars. Firstly, three 
characters are represented, ‘Bhuppa, Guruh, and Rato’, which 
translate to ‘the parents, the teachers, and the government’. 
                                                          
14 Ali Karrar Shinhaji was interviewed at his Islamic Boarding School on Friday, 23 
March 2018 before Jumah prayer. 
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Secondly, ‘Taretan dibi’ and thirdly, ‘Lebbhi bagus pote tolang 
atembheng pote mata’. Those these three values are important factor 
in identifying social interaction within the Sampang society.  
Let’s take a look at the first value of Sampang people: 
“Bhuppa, Guruh, and Rato.” Bhuppa means parent and it is the micro 
level of the society, while the Rato has power over the society. Rato 
represents the government in each level. Rato is the macro level, 
while Guruh is on the mezzo level, the mid position between the 
micro and macro levels. Guruh represents Islamic clerics, Islamic 
teachers working in mosques, or Islamic clerics working in Islamic 
Boarding Schools. Guruh is the mediator between the Bhuppa and 
Rato in the Sampang society.15  
Bhuppa represents the symbol of the family, which is the 
primary structure of Sampang society. Because family is the main 
pillar of society, every family member is responsible for protecting 
the prestige of their family. On account of this attitude, the 
neighborhood development of Sampang society is very strong. A 
consequence is that, something felt or done by a member of the 
family represents the whole family, even if it was a positive or 
negative matter.16 This family system is symbolized by the Taneyan 
Lanjhang (The Long Front Page of House). It means that the 
extended family is still related to family with the The Long Front 
Page. For example, in Madurese culture every father has an 
obligation to build a house for his daughter once she gets married, 
but he does not need to build a house for his son because the son will 
follow his wife once they get married.17 
Guruh represents the Islamic teachers or specifically the 
Muslim cleric (Kyai). Guruh, or Kyai, is an important role because he 
teaches Islamic teachings and guides society in the world or after 
life18. Besides the previously mentioned roles, the Guruh is also a 
mediator between the micro level (Bhuppa) and macro level (Rato). 
Madurese society honors the Guruh because, in their opinion, they 
have special privileges including ilmu kesaktian (uncommon 
                                                          
15 Muhammad Afdilla, Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik, 26-27. 
16 Ibid. 
17 A. Latief Wiyata, Carok: Konflik Kekerasan Dan Harga Diri Orang Madura,  
second edition (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2006), 44. 
18 Abdur Rozaki, Menabur Kharisma Menuai Kuasa; Kiprah Kiai Dan Blatter 
Sebagai Rezim Kembar Di Madura (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Marwa, 2004), 4. 
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knowledge). The Guruh or Kyai also has a special position in 
Madurese society. Commonly Kyai are invited by the people to pray 
for celebrations or social traditions such Maulidan (the celebration of 
Prophet Muhmmad) and other events. This produces an economic 
impact for the Kyai. In Madurese society, they do not allow the Kyai 
to work. Consequently, they give compensation to the Kyai by giving 
a portion of rice to them every time there is a harvest. Kyai, in 
Madurese society, is the central position; the Kyai consults all issues 
in the society. Because of this, Kyai are the cultural brokers between 
the society and government. 
Rato represents the government. Rato is the highest position in 
Madurese society because they have the responsibility to protect the 
socio-economic and political values of the society. Rato, or the 
government, also has the primary position in Madurese society and 
uses politics to solve problems amongst the people. The Madurese 
society often enrolls Ratos and Guruhs to mediate and solve 
problems. Together, conducted by society, they handle the problems 
of all the citizen’s.19 In Madurese society the Guruh and Rato have 
become the backbone for solving all the problems and for protecting 
the people from threats. The interaction between the Guruh and Rato 
is supportive. It is common in Madurese society that the government 
apparatus often ask and consults with the Kyai for declaring public 
policies in Madura. The government needs support from the Kyai to 
deal with public policy. Generally, the Rato visit the Kyai to ask for 
advice about the matter. Some of them ask the Kyai for support in 
the general election. The Kyai also need the politicians and their 
bureaucracy for fundraising and access of facilities for funding and 
other opportunities. The relation between the two is mutualistic 
symbiosis, meaning they need each other. 
There are two traditions of Madurese society that still exist 
today: taretan dibi which means brotherhood and friendship; and 
lebbhi bagus pote tolang etembheng pote mata, which means “it is 
better to die rather than humiliated.” These cultural values may seem 
to contradict one another, but they actually could empower the spirit 
of conflict and reconciliation amongst Madurese society. The concept 
                                                          
19 Yohanes Bahari, ‘Model Komunikasi Lintas Budaya dalam Resolusi Konflik 
Berbasis Pranata Adat Melayu dan Madura di Kalimantan Barat’, in the Journal Ilmu 
Komunikasi , no. 2 (Mei 2008): 112. 
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of Bhuppa, Guruh in Madurese philosophy refer to the spirit of 
brotherhood and togetherness. This value creates advantages for 
Madurese in the outside world. Specifically, they will support and 
help each other no matter where they are.20 Madurese society has 
philosophical value: “taretan dhibi, which is the attitude brotherhood 
and friendship in society21. Taretan dhibi was manifested by Gerjih, 
which means working together. Gerjih is the tradition of Madurese 
society to support each other. 
The value of lebbhi bagus pote tolang etembheng pote mata 
could be both the possible tool for the integrated system of Madurese 
society, and the cause of conflict among the society. This value refers 
to the obligation for every Madurese to protect their good image, 
their prestige, and their other family values in Madurese society. In 
order to protect these values, Madurese will defend their values at all 
costs, even to death. This tradition is manifested by the ‘carok’. 
Carok is a duel between two individuals until one of them is killed. 
One way carok is instigated is when a person is caught in 
contestation for a woman. Carok can also be instigated by religious 
blasphemy, personal property problems, and humiliation.22 
Once again, Gerjih is the symbol of coordination, solidarity and 
neighborhood development. Gerjih is the positive side and could 
strengthen the Madurese society. Based on my interview with the key 
informant of FKUB (Interreligious forum of Madura), the Gerjih 
could be tool of reconciliation between the Sunni and Shi’ites in 
Sampang, Madura. The challenge of both values is how to manage 
the value related to the social, economic and religious issues. Those 
values can be used as an opportunity to reconcile, but those values 
could also trigger conflict. In other words, the values are like a knife 
that has two sides. One side can be used as tool for cooking, but the 
other side can be used to kill. 
                                                          
20 Yohanes Bahari, ‘Model Komunikasi Lintas Budaya dalam Resolusi Konflik 
Berbasis Pranata Adat Melayu dan Madura di Kalimantan Barat’, Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi’, 
112. 
21 As researchers when We observed through fieldtrip in Sampang Madura I feel 
those attitude (taretan dhibbi/ botherhood and friendship). We were accompanied by friend 
of Madurese He mediates us to meet the key informan of Religious and social figure in 
Sampang such as the chairman of MUI, the chairman of FPI, The chairman of AUMA 
(Madura’s Ulama Alliance) and other figures in Madura.  
22 Mohammad Afdilla,Dari Masjid Ke Panggung Politik, 33-34. 
From Personal to Communal: The … 
 
 
 
Sunan Kalijaga, Volume 2, Number 1, 2019 41 
C. The Escalated Conflict: From Family to Province 
Conflict amongst communities in Indonesia is categorized into 
three. The first category is cultural conflict. This conflict deals with 
ideology and values such as stereotyping, discoursing through public 
opinion, and the wide spreading of opinions on society. This 
discourse also could be manifested by a fatwa or public policy issued 
by the government that discriminates others, especially religious 
minorities.23 The second category is mass movements. It is displayed 
by a show of force using mass demonstrations addressing conflicted 
groups. For example, a demonstration organized by a mass 
organization may ask the government to ban Shi`a, or they may ask 
the MUI to give a fatwa declaring another community as a deviant 
group. The third category is violence. Violence is a conflict with 
physical and psychological aspects. Examples are about destroying 
the buildings or places of worship.24 
According to Galtung, there is a triangle of violence: direct, 
structural, and cultural violence.25 Direct violence refers to physical 
and mental violence; indirect violence refers to structural violence; 
and structural violence comes from the social structure itself–
between humans, between sets of humans (societies), and between 
sets of societies (alliances, regions) in the world. Inside human beings 
there is an indirect, non-intended, inner violence that comes from the 
personality structure.26 The major form of outer structural violence is 
well known, and is repression and exploitation in politics and 
economics. Cultural violence is in symbolism, religion and ideology, 
language and art, science and law, and in media and education. These 
can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.27 
In discussing the violence against Shi`ite community in 
Sampang, it appears on all aspects of life against Shi`a community in 
Sampang and even in Sidoarjo including freedom of expressing 
                                                          
23 Nawari Ismail, Relasi Islam Sempalan, Islam Mapan, dan Negara (Yogyakarta: 
Penerbit Samudera Biru, 2014), 85 
24 Ibid, 85 
25 Johan Galtung, Peace by peaceful means, peace and conflict, development and 
civilization (Oslo: International Peace research institute/ SAGE Publication,1996), 3. 
26 Ibid., 2-3. 
27Ibid., 196. 
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religiosity, freedom of fear, freedom of life, economic, education and 
others. Both direct and indirect violence obviously exist in this case.  
 
Table 2. Types of Violence according to Galtung. 
 
Form of 
Violence 
Survival 
Needs 
Well-Being 
Needs 
Identity Needs Freedom Needs 
Direct 
Violence 
Killing Maiming 
Siege, 
Sanctions 
Misery 
Desocialization 
Resocialization 
Secondary 
Citizen 
Repression 
Detention 
Expulsion 
Structural 
Violence 
Exploitation 
A  
(Strong) 
Exploitation 
B 
(Weak) 
Penetration 
Segmentation 
Marginalization 
Fragmentation 
 
In addition, there are five triggers of conflict. The first trigger 
is competition: the effort to achieve something by being a victim. 
The second trigger is domination. Domination is when one group 
tries to regulate the other group, which in turn causes the regulated 
group to clash with the dominating group. The third trigger is failure 
to blame a certain group if it fails to pursue its goal. The fourth 
trigger is provocation: when one group mocks the other. This action 
creates unhappy feelings for the other. The fifth trigger is difference 
of values. Different values may not always align when determining 
whether something is right or wrong.28 Rather different, the triggers 
of conflict according to Fox are individual hate, self -defense, 
enlarging the problem, limited communication, closed culture, 
tension, increased doubt, polarization, discrimination, and 
disturbance.29  
Conflict between the Shi`ite and Sunni in Sampang was 
triggered by at least three factors. The first factor was that Shi`a in 
Sampang Madura were rejected by the Madurese Ahl al Sunnah wa al 
jama’ah because its existence created a disturbance. The root cause 
of this problem was the different ideologies. This made some want to 
                                                          
28 Sabian Utsman, Anatomi Konflik dan solidaritas Masyarakat Nelayan, Sebuah 
Penelitian Sosiologis (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2007), 16. This theory also was 
described by Abu Bakar on his dissertation. Please read more on  Rifa’i Abu Bakar, 
Dinamika Gerakan Syiah, 391. 
29 Anne Fox, Mengendalikan Konflik, Tips-Taktik-Teknik, translated by Ary 
Kristanti (Surabaya: Selasar Publishing, 2009), 9. 
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exile the Shi’a. The second factor was the repetitive propagation of 
Shi’a ideology in Sampang. The Sunni group disliked the method 
Tajul Muluk used for spreading Shi`a beliefs, which increased 
tensions. The civil unrest towards the Shi’a became latent and 
conflict emerged because Tajul convinced some to become his 
followers. This attitude made the Sunni group angry. The third factor 
was the leader of the Shi`a in Sampang stating that the holy Qur’an 
was not original and that the original one was revealed to Imam 
Mahdi.30 
The primary factors that became the triggers of conflict was the 
concept of Imamah. The imamah concept made the conflict 
unending.31 The witness protection institution (Lembaga 
Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban/LPSK) found five root causes for the 
conflict between the Shi`a and Sunni.32 The first root cause was the 
emergence of the fatwa, which contained statements from the MUI, 
the chairman of the NU, and BASSRA Ulama, declaring the Shi`a as a 
deviant sect. This caused some Shi’i to return to Sunni Islam. The 
second root cause was when the chairman of the Sampang 
Government ignored Shi`a followers in Sampang. The third root cause 
was the ruling issued from both the Sampnag state court and the high 
court of East Java declaing Tajul Muluk as a Sunni guilty of religious 
blasphemy. Tajul was sentenced to prison for two years as a 
consequence, but the sentence was adjusted to four years. The fourth 
root cause was personal conflict between Rois and Tajul Muluk who 
lead the Madurese Shi’a members for a long time. The fifth root 
cause occurred during local government elections.  
The previous triggers of conflict caused the violence against the 
Shi’a. Violence is behaviour involving physical force intended to 
hurt, damage, or kill someone or something.33 In other words, 
                                                          
30 Dicky Sofjan (editor), Sejarah dan Budaya Syiah di Asia Tenggara (Yogyakarta: 
ICRS UGM, 2013), 278-280. 
31 The Chairman of MUI K.H. Bukhori Ma’shum also states that Imamah according 
to Sunni Group is dangerous ideology. Because based on the ideology of Imamah, Shi’ah can 
be a rebellion to the official government. I interview the Chairman of MUI K.H. Bukhori 
Ma’shum on 26 March 2018 on his house at 09.15 AM. 
32 https://news.detik.com/berita/2240068/lpsk-temukan-5-penyebab-konflik-sunni-
syiah-di-sampang-madura. accesed at 07 december 2018. 
33 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/violence. accessed at 8 december 
2018. 
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violence can be defined as all actions that disturb others either 
physically or psychologically, including the despotism of human 
rights and basic needs.34 Included in this definition is direct violence, 
indirect violence, repressive violence, and alienating violence.  
The first, direct violence, refers to behavior likely to directly 
attack someone physically or psychologically. An example of this 
violence is exiling to someone to another place, burning a house or 
property, and killing. The second, indirect violence, refers to all 
actions that damage human beings, including persistant indirect 
death threats between the victim and party responsible for the 
problem. An example of this type of violence is omission. Omission 
would be similar to when the houses of Tajul Muluk’s followers were 
burnt down and the police mishandled the matter. The third, 
repressive violonce, refers to the revocation of basic rights such as 
the right to be protected from pain and suffering.35 An example of 
this violence would be witholding civil, politic, and social rights. The 
fourth, alienative violence, refers to revocation of higher individual 
rights, such as the right for psychological, cultural and intellectual 
growth. 
 
D. Fatwa, Public Policy and Discrimination 
A Fatwa is an Islamic legal opinion that is morally binding, 
whilst the public policy is the decision or action that is made by 
those in Political authority (government) that is legally binding. 
Madurese society is commonly built upon religious authorities, 
through the influence of Kyai, who are powerful in Sampang society. 
Muftis in fatwa commission of MUI’s Sampang regency are part of 
that religious authority, whilst the government who designs the 
public policy is part of state authority. Although Madurese society is 
commonly constructed as a traditional society, they also generally 
submit and respect the government. It is evident that in this case, the 
                                                          
34 Jamil Salmi, Violence and  Democratic society Hooliganisme dan Masyarakat 
Demokrasi (Yogyakarta: Pilar Media, 2005), 35. Compare on the book of John Keane, 
Violence and Democracy (contemporary political Theory), (UK: Cambridge University 
Press,2004), 89. 
35 Jamil Salmi, Violence and Democratic Society, 41. 
From Personal to Communal: The … 
 
 
 
Sunan Kalijaga, Volume 2, Number 1, 2019 45 
role of the government was invited as a resolution of the Shi`a 
Sampang case. 
To capture the process of production of fatwa and public 
policy, the figure below will help us understand how both fatwa and 
public policy work to protect the religious orthodoxy in Sampang 
community: 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Process of production of fatwa and public policy. 
 
Many factors play for issuing fatwa against Shi’a in Sampang. 
The first factor is difference in ideologies. This factor is the primary 
factor for the issuing of the fatwa. The difference in ideologies 
creates the “othering” factor amongst the Sunni society, in Sampang 
in particular, and in East Java in general, causing a split in society. 
Exclusion of those who differed from the Sunni occurred by 
constructing the mindset “We” for the majority and “They” for 
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minority. The implication of this framing is cultural and structural, 
causing such things as discrimination, marginalization, prejudice, 
stereotyping, persecution, relocation, and other forms of violence. 
The other factor are the economic and political factors. The evidence 
of this economic factor is the emerging term “Kyai Amplop” (lit. The 
Kyai of Envelop) that was used by Tajul Muluk. This statement 
angered the Sampang society. The other evidence is Tajul’s 
reformation of religious tradition such as “maulidan”. Economics and 
politics are interconnected especially in the effort of reformation, 
with the local government managing correspondence and licensing 
through a village government. The political factor also contributed to 
the demand of the government to issue the fatwa. The other factors 
are the social jealousy and psychological factors. The increase in 
Tajul’s followers made the local clerics feel less power in their 
religious authority. 
The fatwa becomes a religious instrument to exclude the Shi`a 
from Sampang society. The evidence that the fatwa of MUI Sampang 
regency was a religious instrument was justified by the local 
government when The State Court sentenced Muluk for two years in 
prison for religious blasphemy. When Tajul Muluk proposed this 
issue to the higher state court of East Java province, the judge 
sentenced him to four years in prison.  
The evidence based of the interconnection between the fatwa of 
Sampang regency with public policy is the content of the fatwas (in 
Sampang regency level and in East Java Province level), which 
recommends the local government to issue the public policy for 
regulating the Shi`a. The local government of East Java province 
response of both fatwas was to regulate the Shi`a through governor 
regulation number 55 of 2012, concerning Tentang Pembinaan 
Kegiatan Keagamaan dan Pengawasan Aliran Sesat di Jawa Timur 
(the supervision of religious activity and monitoring on heretical 
sects in East Java). 
The interconnection between the fatwa and public policy in 
Sampang and East Java Province is evident on the Peraturan 
Gubernur (Pergub) (Governor regulation) of East Java Province, 
which mentions in its content the giving of authority for MUI in local 
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regions to measure the parameters of whether sects are heretical or 
not. The local government will follow up the recommendation from 
the religious authority to supervise and monitor, as well as identify 
the heretical sect. Framing the fatwa in a positive way was the 
process for it becoming the law at local and national level. 
The religious authority and state authority need each other. 
This reason is due to the culture of the East Java community, 
especially the Sampang Madura District. For example, the Kyai 
occupies a very strategic position, but the clerics were limited in their 
power in the context of the law. The Kyai also needed a ruler to 
ensure that the Kyai's will with his followers could be accommodated 
by the state. Simultaneously, the state in making policies requires 
legitimacy from the community. The Kyai has a strong base of 
legitimacy in the community which often becomes the government's 
reference in making government policies. When the will of Kyai as 
the holder of religious and social authority has been accommodated 
by the government as the authority of the state through the 
establishment of public policies that are binding on all citizens, this 
is what I call the positivisation of fatwas in public policy. The impact 
of the state support for the interest of majority is that the minority 
will be excluded from the society. It results in marginalization and 
discrimination on all aspects of life. The relocation of them is an 
example of exclusion, being exiled from their motherland. They were 
removed from their social roots of original culture and society. 
 
E. Displacement: The role of State in relocating Madurese Shi`a 
Discourse and social practice are inseperable, such as the fatwa 
and the emerging violence.36 The issuing of the fatwa against Shi`a in 
Sampang seemed to be a means of reinforcement for the community 
to commit violence against Shiites as well as shows how religious 
authorities37 played an important role in displacing Shi`ite of 
                                                          
36 Luthfi Asy syaukani, Fatwa and Violence in Indonesia,Journal of Religion and 
Society Volume 11 (2009),1. According to Him the fatwa and violence are strong 
connection. 
37 In accordance with Weber’s view, religious authority may be defined as “a certain 
quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and 
treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
qualities. For more description please read Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic 
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Sampang in the refugee camp, “Puspo Agro” in Sidoarjo. According 
to Fitria, a citizen of the refugee camp, the fatwa against Tajul 
Muluk’s teachings by MUI Sampang rmade the Government relocate 
them quickly from Sampang to Sidoarjo.38  
On August 26, 2012, The worst case against Shi`a occurred. It 
happened due to an explosion of conflict when a number of groups of 
students from the Shiite community returned to Bangil, Pasuruan, 
after a vacation Eid Al-Fitr. By the time they returned, dozens of 
mobs had already blocked and threatened to burn and kill them, 
because they actually were not allowed to study in Bangil. The 
crimes continued with burning a number homes owned by Shi’a 
residents. This action resulted from clashes between the two 
groups.39 Although the government protected them by evacuating 
them to the sport Center (GOR) of Sampang, the threats, 
nevertheless, continued from the Sunni community, with the 
Sampang society, supported by the clerics, holding the “Tabligh 
Akbar” to dispel them from Sampang. Worried that there would be a 
clash between Sunni at Shi’ite at that time, the Government issued a 
policy, through the security apparatus, to evacuate the Shi’ite from 
Sampang to Sidoarjo by force.40 
There were at least 235 refugees, including adults and children, 
evacuated by the government under security of the police to the 
Puspo Agro refugee camp. The policy for relocating Shi`a groups from 
Sampang, on one hand, was to prevent secondary conflicts between 
the two groups, although these refugee camps have and will cause 
new difficult social problems for the refugees. These refugees no 
longer have the right to live freely and carry out social activities. It 
                                                                                                                                        
Organization, transl. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glancoe-Ill: The Free Press, 1957), 
329. In other article about that We could read on Zulkifli, The Ulama in Indonesia: Between 
Religious Authority and Symbolic Power, in the Journal MIQOT Vol. XXXVII No. 1 
Januari-Juni 2013,185. 
38I interview Fitria (the wife of Iklil) in Puspo Agro the camp of Refugee at 
Jemundo, Sidoarjo. At 11.00, 21 march 2018. 
39 Hazim, Dampak Sosial Dan Psikososial Bagi Pengungsi Pasca Konflik Antara 
Sunni - Syiah Di Sampang Madura, in the Journal Of Psikologia, 11. 
40 Rudi Setiadi was be interviewed (He is the Chairman of KESBANGPOL of 
Sampang) at his house at 21 March 2018 at 19.00 PM. I also interview the staff of social 
officer at Sampang Government at 23 march 2018 at the social office of Sampang Regency. 
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also higlights the fact that their social and economic capitals were in 
Sampang, not in Jemundo, Sidoarjo.41 
Since power is one way of gaining compliance with the 
decisions made by those who are in a position of authority, the 
process of relocating the Shi’ite society to Sidoarjo reveals how the 
authority use their power to create the policy.42 The process of the 
relocation of the Shi’ite society in Sidoarjo cannot be separated from 
the fatwa and public policy in Sampang and East Java. This is 
because, during the New Order era, MUI was under the great 
influence of the New Order government which is indicated with most 
of the fatwas MUI issued to give religious justification for the 
government policies.43 For instance in 1981 Soeharto forced all 
institutions to abide the so-called “Azas Tunggal” (The singular 
principle) and asked for support through the Pancasila (The 
Indonesian State Ideology),because through this ideology a civil 
religion could be considered.44 Based on this policy, Soeharto used 
MUI to issue the recommendation to prevent the same influence 
Khomeini had after the Iranian revolution.  
Meanwhile, Shi`a has become a vulnerable group since the 
impact of the geopolitical crisis, especially with the national policy 
of the Indonesian and local government to marginalize and 
discriminate them. The process of marginalization and discrimination 
of the Shi`a society is still occurring on both the national and local 
                                                          
41 Tajul Muluk mentions about the struggle for the surviving in the camp of refugee. 
Some of them work as some of them work as coconut graters, motorcycle taxi drivers and 
masons. I interview him at Jemundo, Puspo Agro, Sidoarjo 21 March 2018. 
42 Elmer S. Miller and Charles A. Weitz, Introduction to Anthropology (Eaglewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1979),  531. 
43 Zulkifli, The Ulama in Indonesia: Between Religious Authority and Symbolic 
Power, in the Journal MIQOT,186. 
44 On this case Dicky Sofjan (The scholar from Indonesian Consortium for Religious 
Studies, ICRS ,Yogyakarta) elaborates about the pancasila literaily means "five main 
principles" in Sanskrit, which comprises: Belief in One God; Humanity; Indonesian unity; 
democracy by consensus; and social justice. For more on the discussion on Suharto's 
management of Islam during the New  Order, see Donald E. Weathermen, "Indonesia in 
l984: Pancasila, Politics, and Power" in ,Asian Survey,25(2),  William Liddle, "Soeharto's 
Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions" The Journal of Asian Studies,58(1) 
1985:68-90. For further information read the Dicky Sofjan,” Minoritization & 
Criminalization of Shia Islam in Indonesia,” in the Journal of south Asian and Middle 
Eastern Studies vol. XXXIX, No.2, WINTER 2016, 32-33. 
Mukhsin Achmad, et al. 
 
 
 
50 Sunan Kalijaga, Volume 2, Number 1, 2019  
level. On the local level Shi`a in Sampang has become the victim of 
the hegemony of power in the contestation between the majority 
group, Sunni, and the minority group, Shi’i. According to Sofjan, the 
contestation between Sunni and Shi’ite is related to the global politic 
crisis between the hegemony of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Muslim 
world. It has become a proxy war45 between them concerning the 
contestation of religious influence. 
The Indonesian society, on the local context of Sampang, has 
also not been able to avoid the phenomenon. The discourse through 
MUI’s fatwa (its content recommendation) appeals to all Muslims to 
take a high attention of the spreading of Shi’a due to their primary 
difference with theSunni community. While, on a locally religious 
authority, through MUI and other institutions such as 
BASSRA/Badan Silaturahmi Ulama Pesantren Madura (an 
association of religious figures owning and running Islamic Boarding 
Schools in Madura Island), Nahdhatul Ulama, Muhammadiyyah, 
declared that Shi`a is a deviant sect. This discourse was adopted by 
the Government on the provincial level through the governor’s 
decree. The incident onAugust 26,2012, occurred just a month after 
the East Java Governor issued the Governor’s decree (East Java 
Gubernatorial Decree No. 55) banning minority faiths to disseminate 
or to practice their faith in public.46 The issuing of the public 
policies, such as East Java Gubernatorial Decree No. 55, was also 
motivated by the governor election in East Java,47including the 
public policy relocating the Shi’ite community. However, in Masdar 
Hilmy’s opinion, the case of Shi’i in Sampang was also motivated by 
the political economic motivation. The combination of politics and 
                                                          
45Proxy War that I meant refer to a proxy war occurring at two levels: one, between 
the traditional bipolar powers of the US, supporting mostly the compliant Arab sunni 
regimes, and Russia, supporting the "rogue states" such is Iran and Syria. The other proxy is 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the context of Yemen, which has progressed from "civil 
war" to what now seems like an outright regional war.Ibid.,36. 
46 Aan Suryana, Discrepancy in State Practices The Cases of Violence against 
Ahmadiyah and Shi’a Minority Communities during the Presidency of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono,in the Journal of Islamic Studies “Al-Jāmi‘ah,” Vol. 55, No. 1, 2017 M/1438 H, 
80. 
47 Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf et al., Politik Lokal dan Konflik Keagamaan: Pilkada dan 
Struktur Kesempatan Politik dalam Konflik Keagamaan di Sampang, Bekasi, dan Kupang 
(Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM, 2015), 28. 
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economic interests makes the government adopt the majority’s 
aspiration rather than give the minority their rights.48 
Under such circumstances, Tajul Muluk and his followers 
accepted the demands to move out of Sampang. The process of 
relocation was organized by the police and Sampang society while 
the government gave allowance to those at the refugee camp. For 
those who didn’t want to move, they were forced to sign a pledge of 
repentance, essentially acknowledging that Shi’a’s teachings were 
heretical and they must return to their previous Sunni teachings. If 
they did not sign this pledge, their houses will be burned and their 
safety would not be guaranteed. Thirty-five Shiites signed the pledge 
and were picked up by the community head and the police to be taken 
to the cleric’s, Safiudin Gersempal, house in Omben.49 
Aside from relocation, there is also an effort to reconcile both 
groups. The effort for reconciliation between Sunni and Shi’i was 
submitted to the government during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono era. 
The reconciliation which specifically discussed the settlement of the 
Sampang case was attended by the following people: Coordinating 
Minister of Politics, Law and Security (Menkopolhukam), Djoko 
Suyanto; Coordinating Minister of Economy, Hatta Radjasa; 
Minister of Religion, Suryadharma Ali; Minister of Home Affairs, 
Gamawan Fauzi; Minister of Education and Culture, Mohamad Nuh; 
Indonesian Police Chief, Gen. Timur Pradopo; Minister of Public 
Housing, Djan Fariz; Cabinet Secretary, Dipo Alam; East Java 
Governor, Soekarwo; IAIN Chancellor Professor, Abdul A'la; 
chairman of the Ahlul Bait Indonesia Syuro Council, Umar 
Shahab;and lastlySampang Regent, Fanan Hasib, and representatives 
of Shi’a. 
The result was positive, with President SBY requesting that the 
Shi’a residents be allowedto return home no later than December 
thatyear. There must be no coercion to repent. Prof. A'la was 
                                                          
48 Masdar Hilmy, “The Political Economy of Sunni-Shi’ah Conflict in Sampang 
Madura”, Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 53, no. 1 (2015),  32–4. 
49 Fitri Mohan, Harian Indo Progress under the title “Hertasning Ichlas: Kasus Syiah 
Sampang Adalah Bagian Dari Transaksi Politik”, 16 August 2013. Hertasning Ichlas, 
executive director of the Universalia Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHU), who has also been a 
Shia Sampang refugee advocate and lawyer since 2011. 
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optimistic that he could repatriate the refugees., while the Ahlul Bait 
Indonesia Shura Council (ABI) says “That there was a great 
opportunity to repatriate refugees, since in realitythere wereno 
experiences of significant clashes between Shi'ite Muslims and the 
majority of Madurese, NU followers, because ideologically and 
culturally, the Shi’a community and NU citizens are basically the 
same.” 
The relocation of Shi`a to Sidoarjo is a result of the discourse of 
anti Shi`a through the process of “othering50” from the majority Islam 
in Sampang. According to, Chiara Formichi, the discourse of anti-
Shia and the violence is a combination of international, national and 
local dynamics.51The international level due to the increasing Shi`a 
movement after the Iranian Revolution and the government’s 
response through the singular ideology, “Pancasila,” to all 
organizations. Furthermore, the phenomena of mut’ah marriage has 
also worried the government, causing the issuing of the fatwa from 
MUI of national level, the increasing influence of religious orthodoxy 
and the issuing of the fatwa on religious heresy in 2005.52  
The mainstream of anti Shi`a in the local districts occurred after 
the fatwa against Shi`a in Sampang, Bangkalan, Gresik, Surabaya, and 
those representing Sunni, such as Jam‘iyah Ahlussunnah wal Jama‘ah 
Bangil Pasuruan, and GUIB (Gerakan Umat Islam Bersatu/Muslims 
United Movement).53 The fatwa from MUI Sampang against Tajul 
Muluk’s teachings was issued on January 1, 2012 after the violence 
                                                          
50 “Othering” is a process of identification of individuals—a visitor or passerby, as 
well as your neighbor or relative—through characteristics that mark them as intrinsically 
different from you, and thus potentially dangerous or likely to upset the status quo. I use the 
term from Chiara Formichi The distinction here, by differentiating “a long process of 
othering” from “mere” sectarianism, points to the fact that anti-Shi‘a tensions did not 
emerge out of nowhere as due only to “sectarian” differences, but were more deeply rooted 
in each particular context, as “othering” had been taking place on a variety of levels. For 
further explanation read the article of Chiara Formichi, Violence, Sectarianism, And  The 
Politics Of Religion: Articulations Of Anti-Shi‘A Discourses In Indonesia,in the Journal of  
Indonesia, No. 98 (October 2014), 1-27 Published by: Southeast Asia Program Publications 
at Cornell University. 
51 Ibid.,2-3. 
52 Ibid., 3. 
53 Hary Widyantoro, Undemocratic Response Towards Deviant Judgment And 
Fatwa: Sunni-Shiite Conflict in Sampang, Madura, East Java,in the Journal Mazahib,Vol 
XVI, No. 1 (Juni 2017), 22-23. 
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against Tajul Muluk’steachings. Following this was MUI’s fatwa of 
East Java issuedon January 14, 2012, after investigating several 
teachings and books regarding Shiite, deciding that Shiite Imamiyah 
Itsna Asyaariyah and other sects of Shiite have the same teaching, 
are deviant, and may deviate others.54 The anti-Shi`a discourse 
through MUI’s fatwa, on a local region and other religious statements 
such as NU, Muhammadiyah, was actually produced by clerics in 
Sampang themselves. The fatwas are accommodated by the religious 
institutional authorities .55 Fatwa’s have also been formed due to the 
anger of a society, including the political leaders of the village, such 
as in Sampang.  
It is clear that fatwa and public policies in Sampang and East 
Java had became a justification for violence against Shi`a,56 even 
though the government’s intention was to protect the them from the 
spread of violence to other regions. This opinion was stated by Tajul 
Muluk while in the refugee camp.57 The other public policy from 
government for the refugees was the guarantee of a living allowance 
(Jatah Hidup), given by the government resource of finance (APBD) 
each month. Tajul Muluk stated, “Bisa saja ada PERGUB tersebut 
agar kekerasan tersebut tidak merebak di daerah yang lain meskipun 
aturan itu juga bermasalah, karena adanya PERGUB tersebut orang 
orang yang menyesatkan Shi`a merasa ada payung hukumnya.”58 (It 
was possible for a government regulation to prevent the violence 
from spreading to other regions although the regulation still had a 
problem, because of the Governors regulation for people who deviate 
from mainstream such as the Shi`a). Based on the previous statement 
with the issuing of the PERGUB in East Java, for heretical sects, 
there was being a justification for people to intimidate, discriminate 
and perform other acts of violence.  
                                                          
54 Ibid., 22. 
55 Interview With Tajul Muluk at The Camp of Refugee Sido Arjo., 21 March 2018 
at 11.00. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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In reality the allowance, each person reiceved about 335 
thousands rupiahs from the East Java government each month,59 was 
not enough to live in the camp. Therefore, they tried to live very 
simple life, and find jobs such as, coconut peelers and construction 
building assistants. According to Tajul Muluk, the quantity of people 
at “Puspo Agro” was 339 people. Nevertheless, they wanted to go 
back to their hometown, however the security conditions made it not 
possible. Government assistance (living cost allowance) in the past 
year has been consistent, but this year (2018) does not yet know 
whether it continues. 
The accusation towards Shi’ites was never proven, according to 
Tajul. Even the envoys from the ministry of religion once carried out 
checks here relating to their religious practices, those which were 
deemed different and heretical were never proven. In his opinion the 
majority of Sunni tend to have looked for justification for relocating 
Shi`a to Sidoarjo. The government of the Sampang region support the 
security fee about 1, 3 billion Rupiah per year. 
The current situation at the refugee camp of Sidoarjo in 2017 
has still not changed, although there is some evidence of slowly 
positive change. Evidence of this is the implementation of “Halal 
bihalal” (the forum for forgiving each other) in the refugee camp in 
Jemundo. Interestingly, 165 Sampang citizens attended the Halal 
bihalal. The other example for potential reconciliation, is a citizen of 
the refugee camp doing the hajj (pilgirimage) accompanied by 40 
Sampang citizens to Mecca. Many of the refugees have also returned 
to Sampang and secretly visited their homeland, not experiencing 
tension in the community. This condition is the social capital for 
reconciliation. 
 
F. Conclusion 
The conflict Sunni-Shi`ite among Madurese society was started 
from family and it increases to province level. Starting from the 
                                                          
59 The Coordination meeting for handling Sampang case at Monday, 11 September 
2017 from The Office of President staff- The Supreme Court- Ministry of Internal Country- 
Ministry of Religion- Ministry of Land and the ministry of Social. This Information was 
accessed from The Office of Presidential Staff. 
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“personal problem” between Rois and Tajul, the conflict increases on 
the higher level in community of Sampang level with the role of both 
religious authority and state authority in Sampang. The conflict 
escalates among them after the relationship was dominated by the 
contravention, competition/ contestation and conflict itself. 
The conflict was also influenced by the hegemony of the 
orthodoxy works through the fatwa and public policy of the 
government. Tajul is the representation of heterodoxy vis a vis the 
permanent ideology of orthodoxy of Madurese society. From family 
conflict becomes the ideology conflict after Roisul Hukama uses the 
ideology of Shi`a to attack Tajul Muluk. The conflict develops from 
family to province after religious and state authority collaboration 
emerges to expel Tajul and his pupils from Madurese society. The 
emerging of public policy through Governor regulation and the fatwa 
of MUI in Province level are the evidence-based of the higher level. 
Fatwa and Public policy are religious and state instrument to 
maintains the ideology of orthodoxy. Fatwa which is actually just 
morally binding transforms to legally binding after it becomes the 
main consideration of public policy issuance of the government. The 
positivisation of fatwa on legal system occurs after the state 
represents and accommodates the power of orthodoxy. The impact is 
that Madurese Shiites become displaced community after being 
relocated from Sampang to Sidoarjo. Discriminations and violence 
against Shi`a community occurs on many aspects of life such as social, 
economic, freedom of religious expression, psychology and other 
aspect of life.  
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